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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conditional Sales-Right to Possession Before Default
B, the buyer of an automobile under a title-retained contract, was
accosted on the streets of the City of High Point, North Carolina, by
an agent of the defendant financing company, to which the vendor had
assigned the contract. The agent told B, in the presence of third
parties, that B was in default in the payments due by the terms of the
contract, and that he, the agent, had instructions from the defendant
to repossess the automobile. In spite of B's remonstrances to the
effect that he was not in default, the agent took the car. Defendant
subsequently admitted that there was a mistake and that B was not
in default. In an action for wrongful taking and conversion, brought by
B against the defendant, special damages for the loss of the use of
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the car and punitive damages because of the behavior of the agent in
exposing B to embarrassment while repossessing the car were allowed
by the Municipal Court of the City of High Point. The Superior
Court reversed the decision of the Municipal Court. On appeal the
Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Superior Court and
affirmed the award of the Municipal Court.'
The opinion of the Supreme Court contains no mention at all of
the right to possession, but there is no doubt that the question of possession was before the Court. It is elementary that in order for one
to recover in an action of this sort he must have a present right to
possession.2 One of the parties, the plaintiff, put the question squarely
before the Court. In his brief the plaintiff says: "However, the plaintiff's action is bottomed upon the proposition that the holder of the
conditional sales contract in question did not have the right to repossess the automobile until default. It is a necessary implication from
the conditional sales contract that the purchaser or the mortgagor
should retain possession of the car until default should occur. It
seems to be definitely settled that, where a chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract contains an express or implied stipulation that
the mortgagor shall retain possession until default, the mortgagee or
holder of the contract is liable
in damages. to the mortgagor if posses8
sion is taken before default."
Thus it is plain that by holding the defendant liable in damages
the Supreme Court has given silent assent to one of two propositions.
The Court held either that (1) the conditional vendee is entitled to the
possession of the car by virtue of the fact that he bought it under a
conditional sales contract, or that (2) by necessary implication from
the terms of this contract or the circumstances of the transaction the
right of possession was vested in the vendee.
If the Court bottomed its opinion on the first proposition it is in
accord with the almost universally accepted theory of conditional sales.
However by doing so it has changed its own view on this subject.
The majority of American jurisdictions hold that one of the distinguishing features of a conditional sales contract is the vendee's
right to possess the property until default. 4 Jones says: "The right
'Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E. (2d)
8942 Andrews
(1943).
v. Shaw, 15 N. C. 70 (1833) ; THROCKMORTON'S COOLEY Ox TORTS
(Student ed., 1930) 460; Note (1932) 18 ConnELL LAW QUARTERLY 71.
'Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 22 S. E. (2d)
894 (1943), Brief of the Plaintiff, p. 5.
' Commercial Credit Co. v. Ragland, 189 Ark. 349, 72 S. W. (2d) 226 (1934);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sanders, 184 Ark. 957, 43 S. W. (2d) 1087
(1931) ; White v. Dotson, 41 Ga. App. 436, 153 S. E. 233 (1930) ; Lee v. Gorham
165 Mass. 130, 42 N. E. 556 (1896) ; Houlihan v. Connecticut River R. Co., 164
Mass. 570, 42 N. E. 107 (1895); Friedman v. Phillips, 84 App. Div. 129, 82 N, Y.
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of possession is exclusively in him [conditional vendee] as long as he
is not in default in the performance of his contract. This must be so
from the intrinsic nature of a conditional sale. Such a sale connotes
somewhat of a dual ownership in which both the seller and the buyer
own the property; a divided ownership in which one of the prime
essentials of complete ownership--the title-is in the seller, and the
other essential-possession and the privilege of use-is in the buyer,
together with the added privilege of acquiring title upon paying the full
purchase price." 5 Other authorities agree, Estrich saying: "Until default the buyer has the right to possession of property sold under
conditional sale."6 Indeed it has been said that "It is almost universally held that the transfer of possession and the right to possession
are essential elements of a conditional sale."7
Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that neither the vendor s
nor his creditors9 can interfere with the right of the vendee to
possession. The purchaser under a conditional sale contract is generally held to have an interest which he can transfer bi sale or mortgage, 10 even though the seller has stipulated against such a resale.:"
A conditional vendee of either realty,' 2 appurtenances,13 or personal
property,' 4 has an insurable interest in the property. The respective
rights of the parties have been characterized as follows: "The buyer
has the beneficial ownership of the property and may mortgage, transfer, or insure his interest in the goods as well as maintain actions against
wrongdoers. Further, the risk of loss falls on the buyer, and his interest in the goods is attachable. The seller, on the other hand, retains
nothing but a naked legal title for the purposes of security."' 5
This doctrine of the buyer's right to possession of g6ods sold under
a conditional sale is in accord with the principal purpose for which
this type of transaction is used in the business world. In the great
majority of instances the purchaser is primarily interested in gaining
Supp. 96 (1903) ; Maran v. Abbott, 26 App. Div. 570, 50 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1898) ;
Seely v. Peabody, 139 Wash. 382, 247 Pac. 471 (1926); Smith v. Ward, 63 Vt.
534, 22 Atl. 575 (1891).
3 JoNEs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES
6
7 EsnucH, INSTALMENT SA-ES (1926) 454.

(6th ed. 1933) 339.

Note (1932) 11 N. C. L. REv. 321.
8
Ivey v. Coston, 134 Ala. 259, 32 So. 664 (1902).
Bickerstaff v. Daub, 19 Cal. 109 (1861).
"In
re Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
1
Pelton Water Wheel Co. v. Oregon Iron and Steel Co., 87 Ore. 248, 170
Pac."In
317 re(1918).
Bashart's Estate, 107 Misc. 697, 177 N. Y. Supp. 567 (1910).
1

Sturgeon v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 112 Kan. 206, 210 Pac. 342 (1922).

,Dunne v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 113 Cal. App. 256, 298 Pac. 49 (1931); Bohn

Manufacturing Co. v. Sawyer, 169 Mass. 477, 48 N. E. 620 (1897); Baker v.
Northern Assurance Co., Limited of London, England, 214 Mich. 540, 183 N.. W.
61 (1921).
Note (1932) 17 MINN. L. REv. 66.
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possession and use of the goods and in paying for them later. To the
typical buyer of an automobile or a refrigerator under a conditional
sales contract the important fact is that he can obtain the use of the
goods at the present time without presently parting with the full purchase price. This is even more true in the case of the business man who
is buying fixtures, goods, etc. under a conditional sales contract. Without the right of present possession the conditional sales device would be
of little value to the ordinary buyer. In a like manner the average seller
is concerned principally with the present transfer of possession and the
later payment of the purchase price. To a certain extent the primary
element of the transaction as far as he is concerned is the ability to
"make a sale," i.e., to convert the goods into accounts receivable, at
the same time retaining security for the payment thereof. He knows
that the lure of being able to attain present possession of goods without presently parting with the full purchase price for them has shown
itself to be an excellent sales stimulant. To both parties the exact
legal status of the title is a more or less secondary consideration.
Nevertheless, persuaded by legalistic logic, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has since 1897 seen fit to hold that in a sale wherein
the vendor retains title until the purchase price is paid the vendee receives no right of possession until he receives title. The logic of the
Court stems from an erroneous construction of a recordation statute
which was passed in 1883 as a result of a line of cases holding that a
conditional sale was valid even though unrecorded.
In 1849, in the case of Ballew v. Suddereth,'6 the Supreme Court
held that a conditional sale contract was good as against a subsequent
bona fide purchaser, even though at that time there was a statute requir-

ing chattel mortgages to be registered and the conditional sale had
not been registered. This fact is significant in view of later holdings
by the Supreme Court that a conditional sale is in effect a chattel
mortgage. Conditional sales were not required to be registered in
North Carolina until 1883. In that year the legislature passed a statute
which read "... all conditional sales of personal property in which the

title is retained by the bargainor, shall be reduced to writing and registered in the same manner, for the same fees and with the same legal
17
effect as is now provided by the law relating to chattel mortgages .... "
In one of the first cases to be decided under this statute the court
seemed to be impressed by what it considered a similarity between conditional sales and chattel mortgages. In 1897, in the case of Singer
Manufacturing Co. v. Gray, the Court said in dictum: "A conditional
sale is a sale but upon condition, in which the purchaser sustains the
-632 N. C. 176 (1849).

17

N. C. Pus. LAws 1883, c. 342; N. C. CoDE AN.

(Michie, 1939) §3312.
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In 1917
relation of mortgagor and the seller that of mortgagee."'"
the Court gave some hint of the reason behind the dicta in the Singer
case. In a case holding that an unrecorded conditional sale was
invalid as against the receiver of the bankrupt vendee's estate, the
Court said: "By the express terms of the law [statute requiring registration of conditional sales], therefore, and under the various decisions
construing the same, these conditional sales are to be regarded in this
jurisdiction as chattel mortgages, and void as to creditors and purchasers except from registration."' 9
Thus the idea that "by the express terms" of the registration statute
"conditional sales are to be regarded in this jurisdiction as chattel
mortgages" is expressed. The statute plainly states that the recording
of conditional sales is to have the same legal effect as the recording of
chattel mortgages, whereas the Court interprets it as if it had stated
that the conditional sales themselves are to have the same legal effect
as chattel mortgages. Such a construction of this statute seems to
border on the fantastic. 20 * Surprisingly enough, this view of the law
has persisted in North Carolina, at least until the present case. 2 ' In a
1-121 N. C. 168, 170, 28 S. E. 257 (1897). But see: Frick v. Hilliard, 95 N.
C. 117 (1886).
19 Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 43, 94 S. E. 526, 527 (1917).
o* Even though the statute will not support the construction which the North
Carolina Court has placed on it, the ruling is not without its merits. In some

instances it is wise to treat conditional sales and chattel mortgages as being the
same thing, e.g. they should both be considered as security devices. By so doing

a court can avoid the injustice described by Williston as follows: ".

.

. No satis-

factory solution of the rights in such a transaction [conditional sale] can be
found without observing that the essential character of the transaction is the
same as that of an absolute sale with a mortgage back. A failure to observe and
apply this analogy has led to injustice both against the seller and against the
buyer. The seller is by a majority of courts denied the two remedies for which
his contract provides; namely, the personal obligation of the debtor and the security of the goods, and compelled to choose between them, though both may be
necessary for his protection. The buyer is also by the majority of courts denied
the protection which courts of equity long ago gave to mortgagors. The opportunity and danger of a forfeiture are the same in the case of a conditional sale
as in a mortgage; yet though it is abundantly established everywhere that whatever the terms of a mortgage the mortgagee is only entitled to obtain his debt
and interest, and that terms of a bargain by which a forfeiture is contracted for
will not be enforced, it seems to be generally supposed that in a conditional sale
the terms of the bargain are to be enforced whatever they may be. The difference
is doubtless partly due to the fact that courts of equity have established the
fundamental principles of the law of mortgages, whereas the rights of parties
in conditional sales have usually been determined at law. But in view of the
general adoption of equitable principles by courts of law to-day, either under
statutes or without their aid, there seems to be no reason why such principles
should not be applied here whatever the form of the action." WI=LISTON, SAL ,s

(1909) 964.

"John Hetherington & Sons v. Rudisill, 78 F. (2d) 713 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928);
Grier v. Weldon, 205 N. C. 574 , 172 S. E. 200 (1933); State v. Stinnett, 203

N. C. 829, 167 S.E. 63 (1932); Harris v. Seaboard Airline Railroad Co., 190
N. C. 480, 130 S.E. 319 (1925); Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 94 S.E.
526 (1917); Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Gray, 121 N. C. 168, 28 S.E. 257
(1897).
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case as late as 1932 it was said: "Moreover, it has been definitely determined that a title retaining contract of the type disclosed by the present record is in effect a chattel mortgage. The law confers upon the
mortgagee the right of possession which he may exercise before ot
after default, provided, of course the taking of the property does not
involve a trespass as defined by the decisions." 22 The Court was speaking in that case of an ordinary title-retained conditional sales contract.
It is elementary that- where the "title theory," i.e., mortgagee gets
legal title to the mortgaged property, of mortgages prevails the mortgagee is entitled to possession of the mortgaged property. 28 "As a
general rule the right of possession follows the right of property; and
therefore where there is no restraining stipulation, the mortgagee, having the right of property until defeated by performance of the condition, has as incident thereto the right of possession, and may therefore
take the goods into his own custody, or maintain trespass or trover for
them against anyone who takes or converts them to his own use."2 4
North Carolina is in accord with this view. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina said in the case of Hinson v. Smith: "In some states
a mortgage is held.by statutory regulations or judicial construction to
be simply a lien, leaving the legal estate in the mortgagor. In North
Carolina and many other states the common law prevails and the mortgage deed passes the legal title at once, defeasible by the subsequent
performance of its conditions, the title then draws the right of possession and the mortgagee may enter into possession of the property at
once or at any time, unless restrained by express or necessary implication, which does not appear in the case before us." 26 This doctrine
has been consistently followed in cases involving both chattel mortgages and conditional sales.20 These holdings, however, have not been
without some confusion, occasioned apparently by the Court's wish to
do justice in a particular case, and at the same time to cling to the
theory that a chattel mortgage and a conditional sale are the same.27 *
State v. Stinnett, 203 N. C. 829, 832, 167 S. E. 63, 64 (1932).
"3 JoNEs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. 1933) 175.
'Coles v.Clark, 3 Cush. (57 Mass.) 399, 402 (1849).
25118 N. C. 503, 505, 24 S. E. 541 (1896).
"Beeson Hardware Co. v. Malpass, 205 N. C. 605, 172 S. E. 215 (1933);
State v. Stinnett, 203 N. C. 829, 167 S.E.63 (1932) ; General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C 508, 142 S. E. 767 (1928) (This case involved
trust receipts which the court called and treated as conditional sales) ; Harris
v. Seaboard Airline Railroad, 190 N. C. 480, 130 S. E. 319 (1925) ; Satherwaite

v. Ellis, 129 N. C. 67, 39 S. E. 726 (1901) ; Moore v. Hurtt, 124 N. C. 27, 32
S. E. 317 (1899) ; Hinson v. Smith, 118 N. C. 503, 24 S. E. 541 (1896) ; Coor
v. Smith, 101 N. C. 261, 7 S.E. 669 (1888) ; Jackson v. Hall, 84 N. C. 490 (1881).
In the case of Grier v. Weldon, 205 N. C. 574, 172 S. E. 200 (1933) this doctrine was followed but the court found an implied agreement between the parties

that the vendee should have possession.
"*In the case of Grier v. Weldon, 205 N. C. 574, 172 S. E. 200 (1933) the
Court said that a conditional sale was a chattel mortgage, and that there was
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Thus, if the Court bottomed its opinion in the present case on the
right of the conditional vendee to possession by virtue of having purchased the property under a conditional sales contract it has radically
changed the North Carolina law of conditional sales. It is possible,
however, that the Court followed the second theory pointed out above.
In that event the opinion was bottomed on the proposition that there
was an implied agreement that the vendee should have the possession of
the automobile. The Court has stated that where there is a stipulation
or a necessary implication in the mortgage that the mortgagor is to
have possession the mortgagor has the right of possession until default.2 8
It is usually held that the stipulation or implication must be found in
the mortgage;29 but North Carolina has at least one case which indicates that an implied agreement that the mortgagor is to have the right
of possession might be raised by facts outside of the mortgage.3 0 Of
an implied agreement between the parties that the right to possession should
be in the mortgagor. The Court points out no element of the transaction, nor
does it mention any language in the contract, which might have given rise to
the implication. Apparently the Court reached into thin air and found a convenient implication. It has been said of the Grier case that it is "an excellent
example of confusion confounded. Had the court held the instrument to be a
conditional sale, which it actually was, and followed the usual rule in conditional
sales, the result it groped for would have followed as a matter of course.' Note
(1933) 12 N. C. L. Rxv. 254.
In Tufts v. Griffin, 107 N. C. 47, 12 S. E. 68 (1890) the Court was faced
with the question of who should bear the risk of loss on property sold under a
conditional sales contract. It was held that the vendee should bear the risk of
loss, for, the Court said, he had promised upon good consideration to pay for the
property. The consideration referred to by the Court was the receipt of certain
rights. Among these rights, as enumerated by the Court, was the right of possession. When the vendee's right to possession was mentioned to support it the
Court cited a case from Massachusetts, a jurisdiction which is in accord with
the majority view that a conditional vendee has the right to possession before
default. The Court in the Tufts case relied on the contract as giving this right
to the vendee. However, in the contract as set out in the opinion, possession is
mentioned but twice. The vendee acknowledges that 'he has received possession
and agrees that in case of default vendor is to have the right to re-enter and
posssess. There is no other mention of possession in the contract.
Possibly history has repeated itself, and in the present case the Court has
again "groped" for a desired result. It is difficult to see why the Court considers it necessary to grope in order to find that a conditional vendee is entitled
to possession. It certainly cannot be because they consider the present North
Carolina rule desirable. In the great bulk of instances the people of the State
pay no attention at all to the law that a conditional vendor has the right of
possession. In the present case, for instance, the attempt to repossess was under
the mistaken belief that the vendee was in default. If conditional vendors were,
as a whole, to begin enforcing what the North Carolina Court has said is their
legal right to possession, with the result that buyers on time lost their goods
although not in default, this rule would last no longer than the next legislature.
Is law sound when the best that can be said for it is that it survives because
commonly no attention is paid to it?
" Grier v. Weldon, 205 N. C. 574, 172 S. E. 200 (1933); Hinson v. Smith,
118 N. C. 503, 24 S. E. 501 (1896).
20Wakeman v. Banks, 2 Conn. 445 (1818); Mason v. Sault, 93 Vt. 412, 108
At. 267 (1919) ; Note (1933) 12 N. C. L. REv. 254. ,
' Grier v. Weldon. 205 N. C. 574, 172 S. E. 200 (1933).
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course, under the North Carolina rule that conditional sales are the
same as chattel mortgages the law applicable to mortgages in this situation will apply alike to conditional sales.
In the instant case the Court points to no facts outside of the contract as raising an implied agreement that the vendee was to have
possession. -The North Carolina Court has refused to imply such an
agreement from the mere fact that possession has been turned over to
the mortgagor. 31 Therefore the conclusion is inescapable that if the
Court assented to the proposition that the vendee had the right of
possession through an implied agreement the agreement must have
been found in the language of the contract itself.
The contract as set out in the record on appeal,8 2 contains no express stipulation that the vendee should have the right of possession.
The only language which could possibly be said to raise an implication
of a right to possession in the vendee is the following :3
"5. Purchaser shall keep the said property free from all taxes,
liens, and encumbrances; shall not use the same illegally, improperly or
for hire; shall not remove the same from the state without the permission of the holder of this contract ...
"6. Time is of the essence of this contract, and if purchaser defaults in complying with the terms hereof, or the seller deems the property in danger of misuse or confiscation, seller or any sheriff or other
officer of the law may take immediate possession of said property without demand (possession after default being unlawful) ......
If, in the Court's opinion, such language justifies a finding of an
implied agreement that the vendee has the right of possession, the
North Carolina rule that the conditional vendoris entitled to possession
is considerably narrowed in its practical effect. The primary purpose
of the language just quoted is to protect the vendor from misuse of the
property. If such language raises an implication of a right to possession
in the vendee the North Carolina law now seems to be that ordinarily
in a conditional sale the conditional vendor has a right to the possession
of the goods sold. This is a right which cannot be defeated by an actual
surrender of possession to the vendee, 34 but if, on surrendering possession, the vendor uses language to protect himself from misuse he
thereby impliedly agrees that the vendee is to have possession. Perhaps
it might be argued that the result, i.e., the practical narrowing of the
doctrine that a conditional vendor has the right to possession of goods
sold tinder a conditional sales contract (if the Court-adqpted the theory
81Hinson
v. Smith, 118 N. C. 503, 24 S. E. 541 (1896).
82
Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 23 S.E. (2d)
894 (1943), Record on Appeal, p. 29.
"' Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E. (2d)
894 (1943), Record on Appeal, p. 31.
" Hinion v. Smith, 118 N. C. 503, 24 S. E. 541 (1896).
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of implied agreement) justifies the roundabout means taken to reach
that end. It is at least questionable whether unnecessary complications
and needless refinements in the law are justifiable.
Unfortunately the Court has failed to explain why they saw fit to
award damages in the present case at all. There is no indication in
the opinion, except for the fact that a conditional vendor was held
liable in damages for taking the property sold under a conditional
sale, as to whether or not the Court adopted either of the theories open
to it. An excellent opportunity to clarify the North Carolina law of
conditional sales has been lost. What would have been a valuable
precedent is just another obscure opinion, deriving whatever value it
may have from the fact that possibly it is a straw in the wind indicating
that the Court is somewhat dissatisfied with the North Carolina law of
conditional sales as it relates to the right to possession before default.
FRED R. EDNEY.
Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and Credit-Recognition
of Foreign Divorce Decrees-Domicile
It is of interest to note that a North Carolina case 1 has recently
furnished the occasion for a reversal by the United States Supreme
Court 2 of its decision in Haddock v. Haddock.3 The North Carolina
case involved the prosecution for bigamous cohabitation of two citizens
of this state who had remarried after having obtained divorces in
Nevada upon compliance with the six weeks residence requirement of
that state. In neither divorce action was the defendant personally
served in Nevada nor did the defendant enter an appearance. Haddock
v. Haddock involved a divorce granted by a state which was the domicile of one spouse but not the last matrimonial domicile of the parties.
It was held that in the absence of personal service or appearance by the
defendant in the action, such divorces, valid in the state where granted,
need not be given full faith and credit by other states although such
states might recognize them as a matter of comity. In accordance with
this rule, North Carolina refused to recognize the divorces in the instant case.
In Bell v. Bell4 it was decided that a state where neither party was
domiciled could not grant a divorce even though both parties personally
appeared. The North Carolina court suggested as another possible
ground for its decision that if it were found that the plantiffs had
I State v. Williams, 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1942). Commented on
in Note (1942) 20 N. C. L. Rrv. 294.
63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. (Adv.
2Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287,

Ops.)S201189
S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 10 L. ed. 867 (1906).
U. (1942).
'181 U. S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551, 45 L. ed. 804 (1901).
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failed to establish bona fide domiciles in Nevada the divorces were void
under the rule in the Bell case. The majority of the Supreme Court,
however, avoided passing upon this question by applying the doctrine
"that if one of the grounds for conviction is invalid under the Federal
Constitution the judgment cannot be sustained."5, Since this view
required the court to treat the case as though bona fide domiciles had
been established, the opportunity was presented directly to overrule the
Haddock case.
The ground for reversal was that the Haddock decision created an
unwarranted exception in divorce cases to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause6 and also to the Act of Congress7 implementing that clause.
In Atherton z. Athertons it had been decided that where the decreegranting state was also the last matrimonial domicile of the parties
divorces obtained therein on substituted service must be recognized by
other states. The court in the present case considered the distinction
between the after acquired domicile of the Haddock case and the last
matrimonial domicile of the Atherton case to be "immaterial, so far' as
the full faith and credit clause and the supporting legislation are concerned." Therefore, it was decided that divorces granted at the domicile of one spouse must be given full faith and credit by other states so
long as the requirements of procedural due process are complied with.
The two dissenting justices 9 took the position that the plaintiffs had
never, acquired bona fide domiciles in Nevada and that the divorces were
not therefore entitled to full faith and credit by North Carolina. This
argument flows from the idea that the sovereign power of the state to
determine the marital status of its citizens should not be infringed upon
by other states simply because of a residence therein for a few weeks.
Furthermore, the upholding of such divorces would tend to substitute
the policy of the least strict state for that of all the rest. Since the
majority of the court expressly refused to decide this question, a
strong possibility of attack upon the "Reno Divorce" is thus left open
in spite of the rejection of the Haddock v. Haddock doctrine. The
cause had been remanded for new trial by the North Carolina court. 10
Consequently it may yet become necessary in this same litigation for
the United States Supreme Court to decide "as to the power of North
Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees be5 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368, 51 S. Ct. 532, 535, 75 L. ed.
1117,
1122, 73 A. L. . 1484, 1489 (1931).
"U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, §1.
7

§905 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. 687 (1928).
181 U. S. 155,
21 S. Ct. 544, 45 L. ed. 794 (1901).
'See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 308, 63 S. Ct. 207, 217, 87 L.
ed. (Adv. Ops.) 189, 200 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
"IState v. Williams, 222 N. C. 609, 24 S. E. (2d) 256 (1943).
B

REV. STAT.
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cause, contrary to the findings of the Nevada court, North Carolina finds
that no bona fide domicile was acquired in Nevada." ' .*
ARTHUR C. JONES, JR.

Federal Venue-Plaintiff Denied Option to Sue in His Home
District Where Federal jurisdiction not Founded Solely
on Diversity of Citizenship

The general federal venue statute reads: "...
no civil suit shall
be brought in any district court against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that
the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought
only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff pr the
defendant."' * A recent case has reiterated the well established judicial
emphasis placed on the word "only" in the statute. Suit was instittited
in federal court in the district of the residence of the plaintiffs and both
diversity of citizenship and the presence of a federal question were set
up as grounds for federal jurisdiction. Held: Since the federal judisdiction was not founded solely on diversity of citizenship each defendant was entitled to be sued in the district of which he was an inhabi2
tant. On apt motion by the defendants the suit was dismissed.
Federal venue is not the same thing as federal jurisdiction. Venue
has to do with the geographical situs of the suit,--with which particular federal court shall hear the case; jurisdiction concerns the substantive power of any federal court to take cognizance of the suit.
Even if jurisdiction is established the venue must still be properly laid.
"1*In that event the Court will face these facts: first, that when the courts
of divorce mill states find that divorce seeking transients are residents having
no fixed intention to depart after the divorce is obtained, these courts are guilty
of falsehood; second, the motive for the falsehood is to obtain the divorce business; third, if courts of other states are required by the Supreme Court to accept
such a finding, then they are being required to recognize that their own citizens
were domiciled where those citizens were not domiciled; fourth, the divorce mill
states, if other states must recognize their product, are enabled to fix the divorce
law for every state in the union as to those citizens having the price of a trip
to the divorce mill states; fifth, whatever we may think should be the solution
of the difficult and vital divorce problem, it would be hard to conceive of a worse
method of solving it than to have the law fixed for the whole country by a few
states framing their law with the motive of making profit from severing marriages.--Ed.
1*18 STAT. 470 (1875), 24 STAT. 552 (1887), 25 STAT. 433 (1888), 28 U. S.
C. A. §112 (1927) (judicial Code §51). Italics supplied. The statute formerly
read: "And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts [circuit
or district] against any person by any original process or proceeding in any
other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be
found at the time of serving such process or commencing such proceeding...."
18 STAT. 470 (1875). Hollingsworth v.Adams, 12 Fed. Gas. 348, No. 6,611 (C.
C.D.
2 Penn. 1798).
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Slaff, 131 F. (2d) 148 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942).
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Unlike jurisdiction, proper venue may be created by consent. The right
to be sued in a particular district is a personal privilege which may be
waived, 8 and, in fact, it is so waived unless the question is actively
and promptly raised. 4 It is now held that when a corporation establishes a process agent in another state it thereby consents to be sued
there and waives any objection to the venue of federal courts in that
state.5*
The statute involved in the instant case is a general act applying
to all federal civil suits for which no special venue specifications have
been provided.d. It does not apply to suits against aliens because the
alien is a citizen of no particular state. 7 Hence, he can be sued
3
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153,
84 L. ed. 167 (1939), 128 A. L. R. 1437, 1447 (1940) ; Western Loan & Savings
Co. v. Butte & Boston Consolidated Mining Co., 210 U. S. 368, 28 S. Ct. 720, 52
L. ed. 1101 (1908); Matter of Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 28 S. Ct. 585, 52 L. ed.
904 (1908); Interior Construction & Improvement Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217,
16 S. Ct. 272, 40 L. ed. 401 (1895); Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S.
129, 14 S. Ct. 286, 38 L. ed. 98 (1894); Graver Tank & Mfg. Corp. v. New
England Terminal Co., 125 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942); Wabash Ry. v.
Bridal, 94 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938). Contra: O'Neil v. Co-Operative
League of America, 278 Fed. 737 (M. D. Penn. 1922).
'Western Loan & Savings Co. v. Butte & Boston Consolidated Mining Co.,
210 U. S. 368, 28 S. Ct. 720? 52 L. ed. 1101 (1908); Interior Construction &
Improvement Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217, 16 S. Ct. 272, 40 L. ed. 401 (1895) ;
Graver Tank & Mfg. Corp. v. New -England Terminal Co., 125 F. (2d) 71
(C. C. A. 1st, 1942); Wabash Ry. v. Bridal, 94 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 8th,
1938). Contra: O'Neil v. Co-Operative League of America, 278 Fed. 737 (M.
D. Penn. 1922).
*Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153,
84 L. ed. 167 (1939), 128 A. L. R. 1437, 1447 (1940) ; Note (1940) 18 N. C. L.
REv. 232. Since a corporation is "found" wherever it has established a process
agent, and since the establishment of a process agent waives venue objections,
this case in effect reenacts the prior venue statute of 1875 insofar as corporations
are concerned. See note 1 supra. Compare Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S.
369, 24 L. ed. 853 (1878), with United States v. Southern P. R. R., 49 Fed.
297 (N. D. Calif. 1892). This effect would be limited where the statute under
which the process agent is established specifies that the agent is to be provided
in order to accept process in certain types of suits. In such case the corporation
does not agree to submit itself to any different suits and only waives its federal
venue objection as to suits mentioned in the process agent statute. North Butte
Mining Co. v. Tripp, 128 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 9th 1942) (suit on cause of
action arising outside the state). In North Carolina the local process agent
statute requires every corporation having property or doing business within the
state to provide an agent upon whom process in "all actions or proceedings against
it" can be served. N. C. CoDE Al z. (Michie, 1939) §1137. However, the service
of summons statute provides that service of summons can be had on a foreign
corporation only "when it has property, or the cause of action arose, or the
plaintiff resides, in this state, or when it can be made personally within the state
upon the president, treasurer or secretary thereof." N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie,
1939) §483.
O*Such as suits in states containing more than one district where different
defendants are citizens of the same state but reside in different districts, or where
property lies in different districts in the same state. 28 U. S. C. A. §§113-116
(1927). Suits under special statutes such as the patent acts or the Federal Employer's
Liability Act, etc.
7
Ri Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653, 14 S. Ct. 221, 37 L. ed. 1211 (1893); Vestal v.
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 210 Fed. 375 (E. D. Tenn. 1911); See
Automotive Equipment, Inc. v. Trico Products Corp., 10 F. Supp. 736, 739 (S. D.
N. Y. 1935). Contra: Meyer v. Herrera, 41 Fed. 65 (W. D. Tex. 1889).
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wherever valid service of process can be obtained. But where the alien
is plaintiff the statute is applied to require suit in the district of the
residence of the citizen defendants* It has no application to suits
removed from state to federal courts. 9 In such case the theory is either
that the statute does not apply because the suit is not in federal court by
"original process or proceeding," or that plaintiff, by instituting the
suit in the state court in that district, waives any objection to venue
and that defendant by his petition for removal also waives any objections he might have.
The interpretation of the statute as applied in the instant case is
well established by a long line of decisions.1 0 Most of them have con",Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496, 14 S. Ct. 401, 38

L. ed. 248 (1894); Fribourg v. Pullman Co., 176 Fed. 981 (E. D. N. C. 1910).
But where removal is involved compare Keating v. Pennsylvania Co., 245 Fed.
155 (N. D. Ohio 1917); Barlow v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 172 Fed. 513 (N. D.

Iowa 1909) ; and note 9 infra, with Hall v. Great Northern Ry., 197 Fed. 488
(D. Mont. 1912). Similarly suits by the United States must be brought in the
district of which defendant is an inhabitant. Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v.
United States ex rel Gibson, 213 U. S. 10, 29 S. Ct. 324, 53 L. ed. 675 (1909)
United States v. Southern P. R. R., 49 Fed. 297 (N. D. Calif. 1892).
"Great Northern Ry. v. Galbreath Cattle Co., 271 U. S. 99, 46 S. Ct. 439, 70

L. ed. 854 (1926); Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 260 U. S. 653, 43 S. Ct. 230, 67
L. ed. 443 (1923); Matter of Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 28 S. Ct. 585, 52 L. ed.
904 (1908); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of
Woodson County, Kans., 145 Fed. 144 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906); Sterrett v. Hydro-

United Tire Corp., 32 F. (2d) 823 (E. D. Penn. 1929) ; Keating v. Pennsylvania
Co., 245 Fed. 155 (N. D. Ohio 1917); Waterman v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 199
Fed. 667 (D. N. J. 1912); Hubbard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 176 Fed. 994

(C. C. D. Minn. 1910); Barlow v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 172 Fed. 513 (N. D.

Iowa 1909) ; Burch v. Southern Pacific Co., 139 Fed. 350 (C. C. D. Nev. 1905) ;
Empire Min. Co. v. Propeller Tow-Boat Co. of Savannah, 108 Fed. 900 (C. C.
D. S. C. 1901); Whitworth v. Illinois Central R. R., 107 Fed. 557 (C. C. D.
Ky. 1901); Cooley v. McArthur, 35 Fed. 372 (E. D. Mich. 1888); Robinson v.
Attapulgus Clay Co., 55 Ga. App. 141, 189 S. E. 555 (1937); see General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 260 U. S. 261, 270, 43 S. Ct. 106, 111,
67 L. ed. 244, 253 (1922). Contra: Hall v. Great Northern Ry., 197 Fed. 488
(D, Mont. 1912); County of Yuba v. Pioneer Gold Mining Co., 32 Fed. 183

(C. C. N. D. Calif. 1887), overruled Wilson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 Fed.
561 (C. C. N. D. Calif. 1888).
'o Male v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 240 U. S. 97, 36 S. Ct. 351, 60 L. ed.
544 (1916) ; Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 215 U. S. 501, 30 S. Ct.
184, 54 L. ed. 300 (1910); Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 84 F. (2d) 739
(C. C. A. 10th, 1936) ; Webster Co. v. Society for Visual Education, 83 F. (2d)
47 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); Sutherland v. United States, 74 F. (2d) 89 (C. C. A.
8th, 1934); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arlington Heights Fruit Co., 191 Fed. 101
(C. C. A. 9th, 1911); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transpqrt Corp., 29 F. Supp.
112 (D. Conn. 1939); Bacon v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 289
Fed. 513 (E. D. Wash. 1923); Railroad Comm'rs of Florida v. Burleson, 255
Fed. 604 (N. D. Fla. 1919); City of Memphis v. Board of Directors of St.
Francis Levee Dist., 228 Fed. 802 (W. D. Tenn. 1916); Rubber & Celluloid
Harness Trimming Co., v. John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams Co., 210 Fed. 393
(D. Mass. 1913) (removal); Newell v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 181 Fed. 698
(C. C. W. D. Penn. 1910); Whittaker v. Illinois Central R. R., 176 Fed. 130
(C. C. E. D. La. 1910); Smith v. Detroit & T. S. L. Ry., 175 Fed. 506 (C. C.
N. D. Ohio 1909); Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 173 Fed. 527 (C. C. W.
D. Tex. 1909); Sunderland Bros. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 158 Fed. 877
(C. C. D. Neb. 1908); see Re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 228, 16
S. Ct. 273, 275, 40 L. ed. 402, 405 (1895) ; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co.
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cerned the combination of diversity of citizenship with the presence of a
federal question as basis for the federal jurisdiction." 1 At least one
action was dismissed for improper venue where the suit was brought in
the district of the residence of the plaintiff but the ancillary jurisdiction
of the federal courts was added to diversity of citizenship as a ground
for federal jurisdiction.' 2 The statute clearly says "only," and uniformly the courts have construed this word to mean "solely" or "exclusively," thus denying the plaintiff any option to sue in federal court
in his own district when the federal jurisdiction is founded on any
other ground in addition to diversity of citizenship. Such a construction
of the word seems reasonable enough at first glance and Mr. Justice
Harlan, in a dissent in the leading case of Macon Grocery Co. v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., raised the only protest against the absurdities
inherent in the operation of such law. 8
The Macon Grocery case involved the typical situation in which
federal jurisdiction was invoked on two grounds,-diversity of citizenship and presence of a federal question. Now, it is clear from the
statute that where the sole ground of federal jurisdiction is diversity of
citizenship the plaintiff has a right to bring the suit in the federal
court of his own district.' 4 (Provided always, of course, that he can
v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41, 43, 10 S. Ct. 485, 486, 33 L.ed. 833 834 (1890); Goff
Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 281 Fed. 613, 616 (C. C. A. 5th, 19225 ; Trapp v. Balti-

more & 0. R. R., 283 Fed. 655 (N. D. Ohio 1922); Wogan Bros. v. American
Sugar Refining Co., 215 Fed. 273, 274 (E.D. La. 1914); A. L. Wolff & Co. v.
Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R., 133 Fed. 601, 602 (E. D. Ark. 1904).
" Male v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 240 U. S. 97, 36 S. Ct. 351, 60 L. ed.
544 (1916); Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 215 U. S. 501, 30 S.
Ct. 184, 54 L. ed. 300 (1910); Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 84 F. (2d)
739 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936); Webster Co. v. Society for Visual Education, 83 F.
(2d) 47 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); Sutherland v. United States, 74 F. (2d) 89
(C. C. A. 8th, 1934) (partnership defendant) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arlington
Heights Fruit Co., 191 Fed. 101 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911); Bacon v. Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco, 289 Fed. 513 (E. D. Wash. 1923); Railroad Comm'rs
of Florida v. Burleson, 255 Fed. 604 (N. D. Fla. 1919); City of Memphis v.
Board of Directors of St. Francis Levee Dist., 228 Fed. 802 (W. D. Tenn. 1916) ;
Rubber & Celluloid Harness Trimming Co. v. John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams
Co., 210 Fed. 393 (D. Mass. 1913); Newell v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 181 Fed.
698 (C. C. W. D. Penn. 1910); Whittaker v. Illinois Central R. R., 176 Fed. 130
(C. C. E. D. La. 1910); Smith v. Detroit & T. S. L. Ry., 175 Fed. 506 (C. C. N.
D. Ohio 1909); Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 173 Fed. 527 (C. C. W. D.
Tex. 1909); Sunderland Bros. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 158 Fed. 877 (C. C.
D. Neb. 1908).
" Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn.
1939).
"3 Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 215 U. S. 501, 511, 30 S. Ct.
184, 188, 54 L. ed. 300, 305 (1910) (dissenting opinion).
"McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41, 10 S. Ct.
485, 33 L. ed. 833 (1890); Tate v. Baugh, 252 Fed. 317 (W. D. Tenn. 1918);

Evansville Courier Co. v. United Press, 74 Fed. 918 (C. C. D. Ind. 1896); Bost-

wick v. American Finance Co., 43 Fed. 897 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1890); Pitkin
County Min. Co. v. Markell, 33 Fed. 386 (C. C. D. Col. 1887) (removal); St.
Louis, V. & T. H. R.R. v. Terre Haute & I. R. R., 33 Fed. 385 (C. C. S. D.
Ill. 1887) (removal); Fales v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 32 Fed. 673 (C. C. N.
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there obtain valid service of process on the defendant.) 15 It is equally
clear that whether or not diversity of citizenship is the sole ground
of jurisdiction the plaintiff cannot, over seasonable objection by the
defendant, place his suit in a district where neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant resides.' 8 Obviously, cases of this latter type do not require
a holding that another ground for jurisdiction in addition to diversity
of citizenship will rob plaintiff of any option to sue in his own district
and necessitate suit in the district of the defendant's residence, and any
statement or implication to that effect would be pure dicta. Nevertheless, the majority in the Macon Grocery case relied heavily on such
precedents to reach their conclusion that the presence of any foundation
for jurisdiction other than diversity of citizenship would necessitate
dismissal of suits brought in the district of the residence of the plaintiff. This faulty application of stare decisis is ably pointed out by Mr.
Justice Harlan. He also finds it passing strange that the plaintiff
should lose his option to sue in his home district merely because he is
fortunate enough to possess another ground for invoking federal
jurisdiction in addition to his diversity of citizenship.l?*
Consider the effect in the instant case. The plaintiffs cannot rid
their suit of the federal question because the court will take judicial
cognizance (when brought to its attention by defendant's objection)
of any federal laws involved regardless of whether or not they are
pleaded.' 8 Plaintiffs are citizens of Mississippi; two of the defendants
D. Iowa 1887)

(removal).

Contra: County of Yuba v. Pioneer Gold Mining

Co., 32 Fed. 183 (C. C. N. D. Calif. 1887), overruled Wilson v. Western Union
Tel.5 Co., 34 Fed. 561 (C. C. N. D. Calif. 1888).
' American Indemnity Co. v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., 63 F. (2d)

395 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); Koncewicz v. East Liverpool City Hospital, 31 F. Supp.
1221 (W. D. Penn. 1940); Gutschalk v. Peck, 261 Fed. 212 (N. D. Ohio 1919).
Luckett v. Delpark, 270 U. S. 496, 46 S. Ct. 397, 70 L. ed. 703 (1926);
Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 270 U. S. 363, 46 S. Ct.
247, 70 L. ed. 633 (1926) ; Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308, 39 S. Ct. 478, 63 L ed.
997 (1919) ; Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 218 U. S. 357, 31 S. Ct. 81, 54 L. ed.
1096 (1910); Re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 16 S. Ct. 273, 40
L. ed. 402 (1895); Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 13 S. Ct. 44,
36 L. ed. 942 (1892) ; .Ex Parte Shaw, 145 U. S. 444, 12 S. Ct. 935, 36 L. ed.
768 (1892); Findlay v. Florida E. C. Ry., 68 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934);
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v: Tompkins, 101 Fed. 539 (C. C. A. 4th, 1900);
Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 178 Fed. 117 (C. C. E.
D. N. C. 1910); Schultz v. Highland Gold Mines Co., 158 Fed. 337 (C. C. D.
Ore. 1907); Tice v. Hurley, 145 Fed. 391 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1906); A. L.
Wolff & Co. v. Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R., 133 Fed. 601 (C. C. E. -D. Ark. 1904) ;
Bensinger Self-Adding Cash Register Co. v. National Cash Register Co 42
Fed. 81 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1890). But cf. Rowitzer v. Wyatt, 40 Fed. 609 (C. C. S.
D. Calif. 1889) (partnership).
I'* See note 13 supra. His further argument that the decision of the majority
would destroy the right to remove is now nullified by subsequent holdings to the
effect that the venue statue places no restrictions on removals. See note 9 supra.
"Whittaker v. Illinois Central R. R., 176 Fed. 130 (E. D. La. 1910); Cound

v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 173 Fed. 52 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1909); Sunderland
Bros. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 158 Fed. 877 (C. C. D. Neb. 1908) ; accord,
Male v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 240 U. S. 97, 36 S. Ct 351, 60 L. ed. 544 (1916) ;
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are alleged to be, citizens of Washington, D. C. and two are citizens
of Maryland. To obtain complete federal adjudication of their rights
plaintiffs must sue each defendant in the district of which he is an
inhabitant. Thus plaintiffs must incur the expense of at least two distant suits-one in Washington and one in Maryland. The Washington
defendants could not be sued in Maryland over their objection; the
19
Maryland defendants could not be sued in Washington. * Also, all
of the defendants might very easily be indispensable parties. In such
event, if they continued their refusal to waive venue, suits brought in
either Washington or Maryland would be dismissed because of the
absence of the indispensable defendants. 20 Thus, the plaintiffs would
be completely barred from all access to the federal courts merely because
they were so unfortunate as to possess two perfectly good grounds for
substantive federal jurisdiction instead of only one.
An amendment to the statute striking out the objectionable word
"only" and allowing plaintiffs to sue in their own districts whenever
diversity of citizenship is shown would greatly clarify the situation.
JoHN T. KILPATRICK, JR.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to
Unexplained Automobile Accident
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently applied the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in a civil action for personal injuries arising out
of an unexplained automobile accident. That doctrine is often stated
as follows: "There must be reasonable evidence of negligence; but
where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
Rubber & Celluloid Harness Trimming Co. v. John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams

Co., 210 Fed. 393 (D. Mass. 1913); Smith v. Detroit & T. S. L. R. R., 175
Fed. 506 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1909); cf. Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 84
F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936); Newell v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 181 Fed. 698

(C. C. W. D. Penn. 1910).
IQ*Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308, 39 S. Ct. 478, 63 L. ed. 997 (1919) ; Findlay

v. Florida E. C. Ry., 68 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 178 Fed. 117 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1910);
Schultz v. Highland Gold Mines Co., 158 Fed. 337 (C. C. D. Ore. 1907); Tice
v. Hurley, 145 Fed. 391 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1906); Bensinger Self-Adding Cash
Register Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 42 Fed. 81 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1890).
Contra: Rawitzer v. Wyatt, 40 Fed. 609 (C. C. S. D. Calif. 1889) (partnership).
Conversely, where there is diversity of citizenship a suit brought in the district of
the residence of a plaintiff may be dismissed as to any other non-resident plaintiffs because as to them the venue is not laid in either the district of the residence
of the plaintiff or the defendant. Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 10 S. Ct. 303, 33
L. ed. 635 (1890).
2' Findlay v. Florida E. C. Ry., 68 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); see
Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308, 316, 39 S. Ct. 478, 481, 63 L. ed. 997, 1003 (1919).
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the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."1 The defendant was driving a car around a slight left curve on a dirt road at
a moderate rate of speed. The plaintiff was riding in the car as a guest.
Suddenly, the car started going toward the right, and continued to do
so until it ran off the road into a ditch, causing plaintiff's injuries. The
defendant testified that he attempted to turn the car back toward the
center of the highway, but, for some reason unknown to him, it failed
to respond to his efforts. Nor did the plaintiff- have any explanation for
the accident. He brought this action, alleging general negligence in
the operation of the automobile, and was nonsuited in the lower court
upon failure to produce any evidence of negligence. The Supreme Court
reversed this judgment, holding that the mere fact of the happening
of the accident raised an inference of negligence sufficient to take the
case to the jury.2
The court did not use the phrase "res ipsa loquiturt" in the course
of the opinion. However, this doctrine was clearly stated by the court.
as a basis for the decision in the following language: "When a thing
which caused an injury is shown to be under the control and operation
of the party charged with negligence and the accident is one which, in
the ordinary course of things, will not happen if those who have such
control and operation use proper care, the the accident itself, in the
absence of an explanation by the party charged, affords some evidence
that it arose from want of proper care." 3
The phrase "res ipsa loquitur," the English translation of which is
"the thing speaks for itself," was first used by Baron Pollock in 1863
in a case where a barrel of flour fell from a window and injured the
plaintiff.4 The development of the doctrine has led to wide-spread
confusion in the courts as to the types of accidents to which the doctrine applies 5* and as to the procedural effect of its application. 6* In
North Carolina it is held that it gives the plaintiff a printa facie case,
thus assuring the plaintiff that he will get his case to the jury, and
creates an inference of negligence which the jury may or may, not
accept.3*
1
Erle, C. J., in Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596,
601,'Etheridge
159 Eng. Rep.
665, 667 222
(1865).
v. Etheridge,
N. C. 616, 24 S. E. (2d) 477 (1943).
'Etheridge v. Etheridge, 222 N. C. 616, 619, 24 S. E. (2d) 477, 479 (1943).
'Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
'* For discussions of the various types of accidents to which the principle is
applied by North Carolina courts and courts of other jurisdictions see HARPEa,
LAw OF TORTS (1933) §77; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) §43; Note (1941) 19 N. C. L.
REv. 617.
'* For discussion of the procedural effect of the application of the principle
see Note (1941) 19 N. C. L. REv. 617.
7* Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N. C. 178, 13 S. E. (2d) 242 (1941), commented
upon in Note (1941) 19 N. C, L. REv. 617; White v. Hines, 182 N. C. 275, 109
S. E. 31 (1921); Womble v. Merchants Grocery Co., 135 N. C. 474, 47 S. E.
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Although courts of other states have frequently applied the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine to suits arising out of injuries sustained in unexplained automobile accidents, 8 the principal case is significant because it is the first such application by a North Carolina court. All
previous attempts by counsel to have the doctrine applied to automobile
accident cases where there is no direct evidence of negligence have, on
facts distinguishable from those of the instant case, met with complete
failure. In some of these cases the court refused to draw an inference
of negligence because it appeared that the accident was caused by
unexplained skidding, saying that skidding often occurs without any
fault on the part of the driver and should, therefore, give rise to no
inference of negligence.9 Most courts agree,' 0 unless the defendant
is a common carrier." Where there has been a collision between two
moving vehicles, the court has refused to apply res ipsa loquitur without
much discussion.1 2 This would seem to be proper since there is no
reason to infer that one party rather than the other was negligent, and
since the injury cannot tefinitely be said to have been caused by the
operation of an instrumentality under the exclusive control of either
party. Most courts agree, but apply res ipsa loquitur where a moving
vehicle collides with one that is properly parked.-' Nor will the courts
apply the doctrine where all the facts and circumstances causing the
accident are known and testified to by witnesses, 14 nor where nothing
is shown other than that a person in the road was hit by an automobile.' 5 Other jurisdictions have applied r es ipsa loquitur where a parked
automobile has started into motion from an unknown cause and caused
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

damage to persons or property. 16 No case of this kind has arisen in
North Carolina.
It has been occasionally held 17 that res ipsa loquitur does not apply
where evidence of the true explanation of the accident is as readily
accessible to the plaintiff as to the defendant. A plaintiff riding in an
automobile as a passenger, as was the plaintiff in the principal case,
would usually be in a position to observe'as much about the cause of
an accident as a defendant driver of the vehicle. This requirement is,
however, of dubious validity. "It is difficult to regard this factor as
anything more than a makeweight, or to believe that it can ever be controlling. If the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable inference of negligence, it cannot be supposed that the inference ever
would be defeated by a showing that the defendant knew nothing about
what had happened; and if the facts give rise to no such inference, a
plaintiff who has the burden of proof in the first instance could scarcely
make out a case merely by proving that he knew less aboutthe matter
than his adversary."' 8
In addition to his allegation of general negligence, the plaintiff in
the principal case alleged as a specific act of negligence that the defendant had, immediately before the accident, passed another automobile
going in the same direction at a road intersection in violation of law.
The court held that this was immaterial due to lack of causal connection
with the accident. Courts have disagreed as to whether or not a plaintiff who has pleaded specific acts of negligehce is entitled to rely on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.19 The court did not discuss this question
in the principal case, merely stating that the plaintiff's pleadings stated
negligence in general terms.
In 1935, the Court of Appeals of New York refused to apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to facts similar to those of the principal
case,20 despite an earlier New York case the other way.21 The basis
of the decision was that the probability that the automobile left the
highway because of the defendant's negligence was no greater than the
probability that the accident was caused by some mechanical failure.
The court in the principal case stated that there was no evidence of any
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mechanical defect in the automobile, and did not discuss the point
further. The writer is in sympathy with the ruling of the North Carolina court, and thinks that it was proper to apply res ipsa loquitur to
the facts of the principal case, thus giving the plaintiff a chance to recover for damages which he probably sustained as a result of negligence
on the part of the defendant.
JoEL DENTON.

